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1. 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
2. Id. at 299.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.  See MINN. R. EVID. 803(2).
7. Id.
8. On appeal, Wright made four arguments in support of his appeal: 1) that the district court had erred
in admitting statements made in the 911 call and to police because the statements violated his constitutional
right to confrontation; 2) the district court erred in allowing into evidence a statement made by Wright
concerning a gun; 3) the court had abused its discretion in allowing Wright’s previous felony convictions
into evidence; and 4) the prosecutor had committed misconduct in his closing arguments.  Id. at 299-300.
9. Id. at 308.
10. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
11. Id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
12. State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d at 302.
13. Id. at 309 (Hudson, J., concurring specially in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
‘testimonial’ nature of 911 calls should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis).
CALLING CRAWFORD: MINNESOTA DECLARES A
911 CALL NON-TESTIMONIAL IN STATE V. WRIGHT
I.  INTRODUCTION
In State v. Wright,1 the State of Minnesota charged David Wright with possession
of a firearm by a felon and two counts of second-degree assault against his girlfriend
and her sister.2  A jury found Wright guilty on all charges and sentenced him to sixty
months in jail for each crime, with sentences served concurrently.3  Wright’s girlfriend,
R.R., and her sister, S.R., did not testify against him at trial.4  The prosecution,
however, used the transcript of a 911 call placed by R.R. against Wright in the trial.5
Although the 911 call was hearsay, the court admitted it under Minnesota’s excited
utterance hearsay exception.6  The prosecution used R.R.’s 911 call in its closing
arguments and the jury was allowed to listen to the 911 call during deliberations.7
After the jury found Wright guilty, he appealed his conviction to the Minnesota Court
of Appeals.8  The court, finding that there was no reversible error by the district court,
affirmed Wright’s conviction.9
This case presented a Minnesota appellate court with its first opportunity to
address the admissibility of 911 calls into evidence in criminal trials after the United
States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington.10  After the
Crawford decision, the admission of certain ‘testimonial’ out-of-court statements by
an unavailable witness will violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation if the defendant lacks the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.11
The Minnesota Court of Appeals decided that the 911 call did not fit into the Supreme
Court’s definition of ‘testimonial’ statements, and therefore held the call was admis-
sible under a hearsay exception without violating the Sixth Amendment.12  Moreover,
Judge Hudson, in a separate opinion, argued that 911 calls should not be considered,
by definition, ‘non-testimonial.’13  The issue now becomes: was the Minnesota Court
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14. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review of this case, with oral arguments on March 9, 2005.
The appellate court’s decision was affirmed on August 11, 2005.  State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, (Minn.
2005).  The Minnesota Supreme Court declined to adopt a categorical rule that all 911 calls are ‘non-
testimonial,’ opting instead for a case-by-case analysis.  Id. at 811.  The court did note, however, that “it
would be an exceptional occasion when a statement made by a caller during the course of a 911 call would
be classified as testimonial.”  Id.  This decision appears to be in agreement with Judge Hudson’s
concurrence to the appellate court decision.  
15. The term “declarant” refers to a person making a statement.  FED. R. EVID. 801(b).
16. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).  State evidentiary rules surrounding hearsay are generally similar to those in
the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See, for example, in Maine, ME. R. EVID. 801, and for Minnesota, MINN.
R. EVID. 801.
17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 739 (8th ed. 2004).  See also FED. R. EVID. 802.
18. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 465 (3d ed. 2002).
19. See id.
of Appeals correct in deciding that R.R.’s 911 call was not ‘testimonial’ in nature, and
therefore properly admitted into evidence despite Wright’s lack of opportunity to
cross-examine R.R. on her assertions in the 911 call?14
This Note considers whether the Minnesota Court of Appeals correctly held that
a 911 call does not violate a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation.  First, this Note will review evidentiary rules relating to hearsay and its
excited utterance exception.  Next, this Note discusses the government’s use of such
911 calls against defendants in so-called ‘victimless prosecutions’ wherein the victim
is unwilling to testify.  This Note then considers the relationship between hearsay and
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.  After a brief overview of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, this Note discusses the recent Supreme Court case of Crawford
v. Washington, and its significant impact on how the Confrontation Clause affects
victimless prosecutions.  In particular, the admission of 911 calls will be analyzed in
the wake of Crawford.  After an analysis of State v. Wright, this Note concludes that
the court correctly admitted the 911 call into evidence.  In light of other court opinions
on this issue, however, this Note concludes that the Wright court’s analysis was flawed
because it suggests that all 911 calls would be admissible after Crawford.  In addition,
the Wright court improperly focused on the victim’s motivation for making the 911
call, rather than the government’s use of the statement.  Finally, this Note concludes
that the Wright court could have affirmed the conviction without narrowing Crawford
because Wright had forfeited his right of confrontation by threatening the witnesses.
II.  HEARSAY AND ITS ROLE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant15 while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.”16  The general hearsay rule is that, because hearsay statements are not made
under oath or subject to cross-examination in a trial, they are inadmissible as evidence
for the purpose of proving what the statement asserts.17  Hearsay policy is based upon
the view that these statements are inherently less reliable than statements made by a
person under oath during a trial.18  A declarant’s hearsay statement is unreliable due
to the fact that it is made without taking an oath, outside the presence of the jury, and
not subject to cross-examination.19  In addition, the inability to cross-examine a
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20. See id.  Evaluation is based on what the authors describe as “testimonial dangers.”  Id.  These
dangers are “sincerity,” “narration-ambiguity,” “perception,” and “memory” issues that, when exposed,
allow juries to decide whether they should rely on the testimony for determining the truth of the relevant
matter.  See id.
21. See FED. R. EVID. 802.  
22. In this Note, the Federal Rules of Evidence are used for discussion of hearsay, permissible uses of
hearsay, and the interaction of evidence rules and the Confrontation Clause.  Generally, most state rules of
evidence are analogous to a federal equivalent.  See supra note 16. 
23. ALLEN, supra note 18, at 457.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).  These statements include those inconsistent with the witness’
testimony at trial, consistent statements used to rebut a charge of fabricated testimony, and statements used
for identification.  Id.
25. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).  Admissions by the party-opponent are the most commonly used hearsay
exemption.  In addition, if the statement is part of a conversation, the entire conversation is admissible to
put the party-opponent’s statement into context.  THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 139 (6th ed.
2002).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 803-04.  The Federal Rules of Evidence also allow for a catch-all exception to
the hearsay rule for statements that do not fit into other specific exceptions and exemptions.  FED. R. EVID.
807.  The so-called “residual exception” allows hearsay if there are “circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness,” id., and the court determines that the statement is material, more probative than other
available evidence, and would service the general purpose of the rules and interests of justice.  Id.  This
catch-all exception is viewed as a “safety-valve,” allowing judges to permit the use of hearsay without
distorting the purpose of other hearsay exceptions and exemptions.  See ALLEN, supra note 18, at 663
(citing G. Michael Fenner, The Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The Complete Treatment, 33
CREIGHTON L. REV. 265, 303 (2000)).
27. FED. R. EVID. 803.  These exceptions cover a wide gambit of statements, documents, records,
treatises, judgments, and statements of reputation.  See id. at 803(1)-(23).  Because these exceptions do not
require that a declarant be unavailable for trial, a witness could repeat the declarant’s own statements in
court as the declarant observes.  The premise behind allowing these exceptions to the hearsay rule is that
these statements have certain qualities that make them particularly trustworthy and reliable, and therefore,
do not require cross-examination.  ALLEN, supra note 18, at 554.
28. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
29. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
30. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
31. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
declarant prevents the opposing party from exposing weaknesses in the testimony that
would allow the jury to better evaluate the statement.20
Although the rules of evidence generally do not allow the admissibility of hearsay
as evidence in a trial,21 numerous exceptions exist to this rule.  In fact, the Federal
Rules of Evidence22 (the “Rules”) subject the hearsay rule to twenty-nine specific
exceptions and eight exemptions.23  Specifically, the Rules exempt three types of
statements made by a witness if that witness is testifying at trial and available for cross-
examination.24  In addition, five specific categories of hearsay are exempt from the
hearsay rules if they are made by the opposing party, i.e., the party-opponent.25
The Federal Rules of Evidence also provide for twenty-six specific hearsay
exceptions.26  The Rules categorize these exceptions according to whether or not the
declarant is available to testify as a witness.  The Rules provide twenty-three excep-
tions to the hearsay rule when the declarant is available to testify, but decides not to do
so.27  These statements include commonly used exceptions such as excited utterances,28
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,29 recorded recollection,30
and records of regularly conducted activity.31  The other five hearsay exceptions
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32. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
33. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
34. “Unavailability” is determined using specific situational categories.  FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)-(5).
A mere lack of presence in the courtroom is insufficient to create the required unavailability.  See id. 
35. See ALLEN, supra note 18, at 623.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1202
(2002).
38. Id. at 1203.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1204.
41. Id. at 1205.
42. Id. at 1207-08.
43. See id. at 1206-07. 
44. ALLEN, supra note 18, at 666.
45. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
46. Id. at 239.
47. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 153 (1892).
include former testimony32 by a declarant and dying declarations,33 and are admissible
if the declarant is deemed unavailable.34  The rationale for allowing these exceptions
is based on necessity and perhaps historical precedent.35
III.  THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND HEARSAY
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”36  The Confrontation Clause is based upon a fundamental principle in
many judicial systems, particularly in England, that a witness’ testimony should be
given in front of the adverse party.37  During the medieval periods, the opportunity to
confront one’s accuser face-to-face was a distinctive characteristic of the common law
trial in England, and in stark contrast to the sheltered witness testimony allowed in
continental European systems.38  Cross-examination, then, became praised by English
legal scholars and judges beginning in the fifteenth century.39  Some English royal
courts, however, clung to continental European legal systems until the seventeenth
century, allowing the use of testimony without the opportunity for confrontation and
cross-examination.40  The use of such testimony was a means by which the English
crown attempted to control its adversaries through the criminal law.41
The Framers of the United States Constitution were aware of the abusive tactics
of the English government in trials lacking a right of confrontation.42  They also
recognized the development of a strong confrontation right in America before and after
the American Revolution.43  The actual history of the Framers’ intent when writing the
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, however, is virtually nonexistent, leaving
the purpose of the clause ambiguous.44
The Supreme Court’s first opportunity to explore the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause arose in Mattox v. United States.45  In Mattox, the State of Kansas charged the
defendant with committing murder.46  Mattox had been found guilty in a previous trial,
but the Supreme Court overturned this verdict and remanded the case for a new trial.47
After the first trial, but before the second trial, two of the government’s key witnesses
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48. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1895).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 242-43.
52. Thomas J. Reed, Crawford v. Washington and the Irretrievable Breakdown of a Union: Separating
the Confrontation Clause from the Hearsay Rule, 56 S.C. L. REV. 185, 190 (2004).
53. Id. at 192.
54. Id. at 192-93.
55. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 37, at 1224 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970)).
56. Id. at 1225.
57. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
58. Natalie Kijurna, Lilly v. Virginia: The Confrontation Clause and Hearsay — “Oh What a Tangled
Web We Weave . . . .”, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1134-35 (2001).
died.48  In the second trial, transcribed copies of the witnesses’ testimony from the first
trial were admitted into evidence.49  Although these witnesses had been fully cross-
examined during the first trial, Mattox argued that admission of their testimony
violated the Confrontation Clause.50  In the Court’s opinion, Justice Brown character-
ized the purpose of the Confrontation Clause:
The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex
parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against
the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness,
in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief . . . .
But general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and
valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy
and the necessities of the case. To say that a criminal, after having once been
convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply because
death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional
protection to an unwarrantable extent.  The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights
of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be
preserved to the accused.51
Thus, Justice Brown, in affirming Mattox’s conviction, constructed a test by which out-
of-court statements could be admitted into evidence at trial despite the Confrontation
Clause.52  
Mattox formed the foundation for Confrontation Clause analysis, providing a
general rule that a defendant’s accuser must give testimony in court and face cross-
examination.53  Yet in its analysis, the Court did not discuss the hearsay rule, and in the
years following Mattox, prosecutors used unsworn hearsay statements by unavailable
witnesses against the accused.54  In cases following Mattox, however, the Court
attempted to maintain that Confrontation Clause analysis was, though similar, distinct
from hearsay law.55
The Confrontation Clause and hearsay law became entangled in the Court’s
opinions in the 1980s,56 beginning with its decision in Ohio v. Roberts.57  After
Roberts, the Court entwined the procedural right of confrontation with hearsay law58
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59. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 37, at 1225.
60. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
61. Id. at 59.
62. Id.  The hearsay exception permitted the use of preliminary hearing testimony in cases where the
witness could not be produced for trial.  Id.  In this case, the witness’ whereabouts were unknown.  Id.
63. Id. at 61-62.
64. Id. at 64.
65. Id. at 65-66.
66. Id. at 66.
67. Id. at 77.
68. Id. at 73.
69. Id. at 75.
70. Reed, supra note 52, at 201.
71. John H. Wigmore was both a professor of law and dean of the law faculty at Northwestern
University between 1893 and 1929.  He was best known for his influential works and treatises on the law
of evidence.  See, e.g., JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923).
72. The general theory can be found in Dean Wigmore’s treatise of 1912.   Reed, supra note 52, at 201
(citing JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-22 (2d ed. 1923)).  Wigmore’s theories had a significant
impact on the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Kijurna, supra note 58, at 1146.
Wigmore believed the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to ensure cross-examination, which hearsay
by offering a general application of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay statements and
out-of-court declarants.59
In Roberts, the state charged the defendant, Herschel Roberts, with check forgery
and the possession of credit cards owned by a friend’s parents.60  Roberts claimed that
his friend had given him the checks and credit cards with permission to use them.61
When the friend failed to testify at the trial, the prosecution offered the friend’s
preliminary hearing testimony under a hearsay exception allowed under state law.62
Although Roberts was found guilty, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed his conviction,
holding that the testimony violated Roberts’ confrontation right because he had not
cross-examined his friend during the preliminary hearing.63
Noting that competing interests may warrant dispensing with the confrontation
requirement in some cases,64 the Roberts Court established that the Confrontation
Clause demanded that hearsay must be restricted in two ways: (1) a requirement of
necessity; and (2) a required “indicia of reliability.”65  Using these two considerations,
the Court created a new two-part test in which hearsay evidence could be admitted
without violating the Confrontation Clause:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confron-
tation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his state-
ment is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.66
Applying its new test to the facts of Roberts, the Court reinstated Robert’s conviction,67
finding that the testimony in the preliminary hearing was sufficiently reliable,68 and the
witness was unavailable.69  
Roberts therefore merged the Confrontation Clause into the rules governing
hearsay exceptions.70  Any hearsay statement falling within John Henry Wigmore’s71
general theory of admissible hearsay exceptions72 would also satisfy the Confrontation
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exceptions rendered unnecessary.  Id.
73. Reed, supra note 52, at 202.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (holding that the co-conspirator
statement hearsay exception is “firmly-rooted”); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992) (finding
that excited utterances and statements made for medical treatment were “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions).
76. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137-38 (1999) (determining that evidence corroborating
a hearsay statement’s truth may not be used to find a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness).
77. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 354 (“Roberts stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis
is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements
were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.”).
78. ALLEN, supra note 18, at 683.  See, e.g., Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique,
57 STAN. L. REV. 569, 586 (2004) (noting that thirteen hearsay exceptions existed in 1960, and over thirty
exist today).
79. ALLEN, supra note 18, at 684.
80. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
81. Franny A. Forsman & Rene L. Valladares, Crawford v. Washington: The Confrontation Clause
Gets Teeth, NEV. LAW., Sept., 2004, at 12.
82. Id. at 16. 
83. Id. at 12. 
Clause because the inherent reliability of a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception offset the
need for cross-examination.73  Thus, the Roberts Court reformulated Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence without any analysis of the Clause’s historical meaning or
intent.74  Confrontation Clause questions after Roberts centered around the Court’s new
test, such as whether a hearsay exception is “firmly rooted,”75 and what is required to
show “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”76  Later, the Court effectively
abandoned the witness unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts, limiting it to
hearsay statements made in a prior judicial proceeding.77 
Roberts and its progeny collapsed the Confrontation Clause into hearsay law, with
limited consideration of the Clause’s true historical meaning.  Critics argued that the
right of confrontation was too easily compromised by the expanding number of hearsay
exceptions.78  The historical methodology used by some members of the Court, for
example, Justices Scalia and Thomas, also suggested that reworking the Roberts
framework would be appropriate.79  Thus, the stage was set for the landmark case of
Crawford v. Washington,80 which separated the confrontation right from hearsay law
and overruled Roberts.
IV.  CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In Crawford, the Supreme Court performed a complete paradigm shift in its view
of the Confrontation Clause.81  This shift resulted in a “radically new way of looking
at hearsay statements in a criminal case.”82  The Crawford Court eliminated the
Roberts test requiring that hearsay statements have sufficient “indicia of reliability” in
favor of a new test distinguishing “testimonial” and “non-testimonial” hearsay.83
Unquestionably, this new test has raised significant questions about what is permissible
under the Confrontation Clause.
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84. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 38.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 40. 
87. Id. at 39-40. 
88. Id. at 40. 
89. Id.
90. Id.  The exception was found under Washington Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).  This exception
applied to Sylvia because her statements admitted that she had facilitated the assault.
91. Id.
92. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
93. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 41.
94. Id.  The Washington Supreme Court reversed a Court of Appeals decision to overturn the verdict.
Id.
95. Id. at 42.
96. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Conner dissented from the Court’s decision to overrule
Ohio v. Roberts, though they concurred in the judgment.  Id. at 69.
97. Id. at 43-56.  Scalia’s history lesson began with the use of civil law practice in England and the use
of pre-trial examinations without the right of cross-examination in lieu of actual testimony.  Id. at 42-43.
The famous trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 was an example used to illustrate the evils of the civil law
examination, particularly in politically charged trials.  Id. at 44.  Raleigh was tried for treason and
implicated by his alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham.  Id.  After being implicated by Cobham, and with the
hope that he would recant at trial, Raleigh demanded the right to confront Cobham.  Id.  His demands were
refused and Raleigh was sentenced to death.  Id.  Legal reforms in England after this period established a
right of confrontation and cross-examination.  Id.
Turning to the use of civil trial examination in the American Colonies, Scalia discussed the
development of a right of confrontation in common law, noting examples of a confrontation on numerous
declarations of rights in eight of the states between 1776 and 1783.  Id. at 47-48.  In response to significant
In Crawford, police arrested Michael Crawford for stabbing Kenneth Lee, who
had allegedly attempted to rape Crawford’s wife.84  After his arrest, police interrogated
Crawford and he confessed that he and his wife, Sylvia, had gone to Lee’s apartment
where a fight ensued.85  Crawford claimed that he stabbed Lee in self-defense.86
Sylvia, during her interrogation, gave a different account of the stabbing that contra-
dicted Crawford’s self-defense claim.87  The State charged Crawford with assault and
attempted murder, to which Crawford claimed self-defense.88  His wife did not testify
against him due to spousal privilege; however, the prosecutor introduced a tape
recording of her earlier interrogation to refute Crawford’s self-defense argument.89
Although this interrogation was hearsay, the state argued that this testimony should be
admitted under the ‘statements against penal interest’ hearsay exception.90  Crawford
objected to this testimony, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.91  Despite his objection, the trial court admitted the testimony, finding
that it had “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under the Roberts test.92  As
a result, the jury convicted Crawford.93  The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, based on the same reasoning.94  Thereafter, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine if admission of the evidence had violated the
Confrontation Clause.95
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,96 presented a historical account of the
Confrontation Clause.  Differentiating between the common law tradition of live con-
frontation and the civil law practice of private testimony given to judicial officers,
Scalia examined the evolution of examination practices and the common law right of
confrontation from pre-Revolutionary England to the early United States.97  Scalia’s
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concerns about the evils of civil law practices, the Confrontation Clause was adopted into the Sixth
Amendment.  Id. at 47-49.  Early state cases carefully guarded this right to cross-examination.  See id. at
47-48.
98. Id. at 49-50.
99. Id. at 50-51.
100. Id.  Included within these numerous definitions were affidavits, custodial examinations, deposi-
tions, prior testimony, and confessions.  Id.  Scalia found a common nucleus in these definitions such that
some testimony would fall under all definitions of ‘testimonial.’  Id.
101. Id. at 52-53.
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 56-57.
104. Id. (“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.”).
105. Id. at 59-60.
106. Id. at 61-62.
107. Id at 62-63.
108. Id. (“The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its
demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude.”).
109. Id. at 68-69.
110. Id. (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to
review of the history of the confrontation right in common law led him to draw two
conclusions concerning the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  
First, Scalia concluded the Framers intended that the Confrontation Clause prevent
the use of civil law practices, particularly ex parte examinations.98  Scalia found that
the Framers were primarily concerned with ‘testimonial’ statements given out-of-
court.99  Rather than providing a definition of what constitutes a ‘testimonial’ state-
ment, Scalia noted that “[v]arious formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ state-
ments exist.”100  Despite failing to give a precise definition, Scalia determined that
unsworn statements made to police officers during interrogation fit squarely into the
meaning of ‘testimonial.’101
Next, Scalia concluded that ‘testimonial’ statements should be admitted only when
the witness is unavailable to testify and the accused has an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness.102  The Crawford Court held that these requirements are disposi-
tive, and not open to exceptions in a criminal case.103  Although hearsay exceptions
existed when the Confrontation Clause was written, they were for evidence generally
considered not ‘testimonial.’104
With these two principles in mind, Scalia turned to the Court’s previous Con-
frontation Clause paradigm laid out in Roberts.  Finding that the Roberts test departed
from the Confrontation Clause’s historic principles,105 Scalia criticized Roberts for
allowing the admission of ‘testimonial’ statements upon a mere finding of reliability.106
Critical of the unpredictable nature of reliability as a test for admissibility,107 Scalia
pointed out examples of where the Roberts test had resulted in violations of the Con-
frontation Clause.108
The Court therefore decided that for ‘testimonial’ evidence to be admitted into a
criminal trial, the Confrontation Clause required that the witness be unavailable and
the adverse party have had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.109  In cases where
courts admitted ‘non-testimonial’ hearsay evidence, states were free to develop and
apply their own hearsay law.110  Despite introducing this key ‘testimonial’ statement
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factor in Confrontation Clause analysis, the Court explicitly refrained from defining
the term’s meaning.111  The Court, however, did state that the Confrontation Clause
applied to “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations.”112
The Crawford decision left many questions unanswered.  For example, the Court
left the definition of ‘testimonial’ undefined, and did not determine whether the
Confrontation Clause applied to ‘non-testimonial’ statements.113  The Court did suggest
that certain ‘non-testimonial’ evidence did not implicate Confrontation Clause con-
cerns, citing business records and co-conspirator statements as two types of evidence
not requiring confrontation.114
Crawford has altered Confrontation Clause analysis significantly, immediately
impacting appellate and trial courts.115  Indeed, commentators characterize this decision
as a “bombshell” and a “paradigm shift.”116  The Court’s decision in Crawford is
dramatic and far-reaching, particularly in the areas of child abuse, elder abuse, and
domestic violence prosecution.117  The true significance of the Crawford case, there-
fore, will center on how the definition of ‘testimonial’ develops.118  The Crawford
decision, however, will not bar the use of ‘testimonial’ statements used for non-hearsay
purposes, where they are not used to prove the matter asserted.119  
The Court gave a list of three types of statements that were plainly ‘testimonial’:
(1) “testimony at a preliminary hearing”; (2) “testimony before a grand jury”; and (3)
“testimony at a former trial.”120  In addition, the Court provided two equivalent types
of statements that would be ‘testimonial’: (1) statements during a police interrogation;
and (2) plea allocutions, or “plainly testimonial statements.”121  
In determining how legal professionals should use the term ‘testimonial,’ one
commentator has suggested two possible interpretations of the Crawford decision.122
The first interpretation would be a narrow one, based on government activities
analogous to the ex parte proceedings the Court thought to be addressed by the
Confrontation Clause.123  These activities could be expanded to other activities used
by government officials to produce ‘testimonial’ statements.124  Theoretically, this
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approach could provide clear guidelines on what types of interactions and statements
are affected by the Confrontation Clause.125  The second interpretation of ‘testimonial’
would be more expansive and look at the context in which a declarant made a
statement.126  If the declarant could have reasonably believed that her statements might
be used as evidence in a trial, the statement would be ‘testimonial.’127  This “declarant-
centric” perspective would be subjective and unreliable.128  As one commentator stated:
“if the testimonial statement category is limited, the Crawford regime might be no less
favorable . . . than the displaced ‘reliability’ structure of Roberts.  Conversely, if the
‘testimonial’ statement concept is expansively interpreted, Crawford could be a
hammer blow for the prosecution of cases with unwilling, incapable, or unobtainable
declarants.”129
The First Circuit had an early opportunity to address the Crawford decision in
Horton v. Allen.130  In affirming the defendant’s conviction for murder, the First Circuit
held that statements by the defendant’s accomplice to another man did not implicate
Crawford because the statements were not ‘testimonial’ in nature.131  Taking a narrow
view of the Court’s three formulations of ‘testimonial’ statements,132 the First Circuit
determined that the statements “were not ex parte in-court testimony . . . [or] extra-
judicial statements contained in formalized documents such as affidavits, depositions,
or prior testimony transcripts . . . [or] part of a confession resulting from custodial
examination.”133  Because these statements, therefore, were not made with the expecta-
tion that they would be used as testimony, the First Circuit upheld the trial court’s
admission of them under a hearsay exception.134  Without Crawford applying, the First
Circuit then decided that the Roberts test for Confrontation Clause analysis should
apply to the ‘non-testimonial’ statements.135
Since the Crawford decision, hundreds of federal and state court decisions have
addressed the issue of whether particular statements are ‘testimonial.’136  Some courts
have consistently used a two-part test to determine if a statement is ‘testimonial.’
These courts inquire:  (1) was the statement made to a government official; and if so,
(2) would the declarant reasonably believe the statement to be used later at trial.137  In
addition to the types of ‘testimonial’ statements defined in Crawford, some courts have
added others.  For example, courts have held that police questions in a Terry stop,138
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responses to prosecutor questioning outside a courtroom,139 and plea allocutions by a
co-defendant140 are ‘testimonial’ statements.  Court decisions have also found numer-
ous other types of statements to be ‘non-testimonial’.  For example, statements made
to a friend,141 statements by a co-conspirator to a confidential informant,142 excited
utterances,143 statements made to police at the scene of a crime,144 and statements made
for medical treatment or diagnosis145 have been determined ‘non-testimonial’ by some
courts.
V.  CRAWFORD AND THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY
A crucial post-Crawford issue is whether an unavailable declarant’s excited
utterance is permissible as a hearsay exception without violating the Confrontation
Clause.146  The excited utterance exception is a significant exception to the hearsay
rule, allowing statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.”147
Federal Rule of Evidence 803 allows these statements into evidence regardless of the
declarant’s availability to testify at trial.  Two requirements must be met before courts
will allow such statements into evidence.  First, the proponent must show that the
declarant was “under the stress of the event when making the statement,” and second,
the declarant did not, prior to making the statement, have the opportunity to reflect and
consider what statement to make.148
The roots of the excited utterance exception can be traced to the early part of the
nineteenth century and the concept of res gestae, meaning “things done.”149  The
concept was that “if an utterance was part of the event at issue rather than a report
about it, it should not be excluded under the hearsay rule.”150  Early courts limited this
exception to statements made during or immediately after an event, 151 but not later
narratives.152  Over time, however, courts have applied the exception with increasing
leniency, allowing greater periods of time between an event and the hearsay
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statement.153  As the Crawford Court suggested, but did not hold, excited utterances,
unlike dying declarations, were not a historical exception to the Confrontation
Clause.154  If any exception did exist, it was severely limited compared to the expansive
hearsay exception used today.155
Before Crawford, courts would admit an excited utterance without any Confron-
tation Clause concerns because it was considered a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception
under the Roberts test.156  Crawford, however, requires that hearsay by an unavailable
declarant be ‘non-testimonial’ in nature.  The ‘testimonial’ nature of an excited
utterance, therefore, becomes the key test for admissibility.  Indeed, since Crawford,
excited utterances have become the most controversial of all hearsay exceptions.157
When determining if a statement is ‘testimonial,’ courts have generally focused on the
intent of the declarant and the presence of government officials during the excited
utterance.158  Some courts have suggested that an excited utterance such as a cry for
help or medical treatment is not ‘testimonial’ in nature, while a statement “that could
reasonably be used at a later trial” or is made in response to questioning is ‘testi-
monial.’159
Under many circumstances, the requirements for meeting the excited utterance
exception might place the statement outside the definition of ‘testimonial’ because the
victim’s lack of opportunity to reflect will also suggest that the victim cannot compre-
hend the statement’s use at later trial.160  This reasoning has been used by many courts
that allow the admission of unavailable declarant hearsay as an excited utterance.  For
this reason, some courts have suggested that an excited utterance can never be
‘testimonial.’161
VI.  THE ROLE OF HEARSAY IN THE VICTIMLESS PROSECUTION 
AND THE EFFECT OF CRAWFORD
Police consider the excited utterance exception during their investigations of
crimes, particularly domestic violence.162  Police carefully note a victim’s demeanor,
assuring that the victim’s statements will be admissible as an excited utterance.163
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Similarly, recordings of phone calls made to 911 for police protection or medical aid
are also maintained for courtroom use.164
Domestic violence is of particular concern for law enforcement.  Domestic vio-
lence is the leading cause of injury to women and affects millions of women in the
United States every year.165  These crimes, however, are often difficult to prosecute
because the victim is unavailable to testify.166  A victim who initially pursues charges
may later refuse to assist in prosecution because of fear or pressure from the defendant,
concern for the family, or concerns about impeachment.167   Due to a victim’s unwill-
ingness to testify, prosecutors often conduct ‘victimless prosecutions’ using other
evidence.168  This evidence often involves the use of hearsay testimony from the victim
gathered during a 911 call, police interviews, and statements to medical personnel.169
A typical victimless prosecution may depend on multiple uses of hearsay and
hearsay exceptions during a trial.  A perpetrator’s identity, a description of the perpe-
trator’s actions, and injuries to the victim can all be attained from the victim-
declarant’s hearsay.170  The victim may make these statements during a 911 call or a
later interview with police officers, and a court will admit the hearsay under exceptions
such as excited utterance or present sense impression.171  These statements, used with
available physical evidence, may be enough to convict the alleged perpetrator without
any testimony from the victim.172
Public awareness of domestic violence has increased in recent years; likewise,
there has been an increased effort by law enforcement and the courts to prosecute and
punish these crimes.173  Statutes targeted at domestic violence have resulted in
significant increases in the rate of arrests for these crimes.174  In addition, judges are
under considerable pressure to punish domestic violence offenders, increasing their
willingness to allow certain hearsay statements.175  Due to uncooperative victims,
however, domestic violence crimes are among the most difficult to prosecute.176  
Crawford threatens the ability of prosecutors to go forward with these types of
cases by barring the use of much of the evidence needed in a victimless prosecution.177
Participants in domestic violence—both the victim and perpetrator—are increasingly
aware of law enforcement and its use of hearsay as evidence.178  In fact, there are cases
of the savvy domestic violence perpetrator racing to call 911 before the victim, and
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thereby securing the arrest of the victim.179  With the increased awareness of these
parties, a victim may well realize that a statement to police and other government
officials could be used at trial, rendering the statements ‘testimonial.’180  
Prosecution of child abuse crimes may also involve an unavailable victim.181  A
child may be incompetent due to age or intellect, or too emotionally traumatized to
testify.182  Thirty-two states allow special hearsay exceptions for child testimony if
there is a judicial determination of reliability—a consideration of the Roberts
criteria.183  The effect of Crawford on these prosecutions has, and will be, significant.
For example, forensic interviews of children used to prosecute a case in lieu of a
child’s testimony at trial have been labeled as ‘testimonial’ by some courts.184  Child
abuse professionals are now being trained to avoid pitfalls that implicate the Confron-
tation Clause during these interviews.185
Commentators have suggested numerous ways in which the prosecution of
domestic violence and other crimes that require hearsay evidence could continue with
minimal impact from Crawford.   For example, one commentator has suggested that
the Court’s definition of ‘testimonial’ be kept narrow and not include certain hearsay
exceptions, such as the excited utterance, present sense impression, and statement for
medical treatment,186 which comprise the three most common exceptions used in
victimless prosecutions.  Another commentator argues that a defendant forfeits his
confrontation right in a domestic violence situation where the defendant has attempted
to prevent the victim’s cooperation.187  Yet another suggested solution is to provide
earlier opportunities, such as at a preliminary hearing, for the defendant to cross-
examine the victim when the victim is a more willing witness.188
VII.  911 CALLS AFTER CRAWFORD
As previously mentioned, prosecutors frequently use the excited utterance excep-
tion to admit 911 calls into evidence.189  These calls, however, may have ‘testimonial’
qualities that implicate the Confrontation Clause.  A 911 call may begin as a mere cry
for police protection or medical assistance, without any ‘testimonial’ quality.  As the
call progresses, statements may be made that are not necessary for assistance and are
geared more towards an eventual prosecution.190  For example, questions and answers
between a dispatcher and caller may detail an abusive relationship’s history.191  There-
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fore, such statements may be ‘testimonial’ and barred by the Confrontation Clause.192
In addition, elapsed time after the event may suggest an increase in the ‘testimonial’
quality of the caller’s statements.193  As a result, the Crawford decision has caused an
eruption of state court decisions194 addressing the ‘testimonial’ nature of 911 calls.   
A.  Cases Finding a 911 Call ‘Non-testimonial’
One commonly cited case, representative of other cases allowing a 911 call into
evidence, is State v. Moscat,195 decided in New York by the Criminal Court of New
York City in Bronx County.196  In Moscat, the defendant made a motion in limine to
exclude the use of a 911 call made by the victim in a domestic violence case.197
Because the witness would not testify, without the 911 call, the prosecution would be
forced to dismiss the charges.198  The Moscat court reviewed Crawford and criticized
the Court’s decision199 not to define the meaning of  “police interrogation.”200  Turning
to the 911 call in the case, the Moscat court held that 911 calls looking for help differ
from the ‘testimonial’ statements addressed by the Confrontation Clause.201  The
Moscat court distinguished the calls from ‘testimonial’ statements on two grounds.
First, the court reasoned, the 911 call was initiated by the victim, rather than the
police.202  Second, the court observed that the victim calls 911 to be “rescued from
immediate peril,” rather than to satisfy the government’s desire to seek evidence.203
These two reasons, the Moscat court held, make the 911 call fundamentally different
from a ‘testimonial’ statement.204  Looking at the English pre-trial examinations in
Crawford, the Moscat court found a 911 call not analogous.205  Finally, the court
reasoned that because a 911 call is usually seen as part of a criminal incident, rather
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than a later prosecution, the caller does not contemplate being a “‘witness’ in future
legal proceedings.”206  After this discussion, the Moscat court admitted the statement
as an excited utterance.207  Two other New York courts, in People v. Conyers208 and
People v. Isaac,209 have followed the Moscat court’s reasoning.
Appellate courts in California have endorsed the Moscat case.  In People v.
Corella,210 a domestic violence victim told a 911 operator that she had just been hit by
Corella, her spouse.211  She later changed her story and did not testify at trial.212
Corella appealed his conviction, claiming that his wife’s excited utterances were
‘testimonial.’213  In affirming the conviction, the California Court of Appeals for the
Second District found the 911 call was not ‘testimonial.’214  The Corella court, citing
Moscat, noted that a ‘testimonial’ statement is made when the government summons
a citizen, which is the opposite of what occurs in a 911 call.215  In addition, the court
stated that a 911 call has no “structured police questioning” or “indicia common to the
official and formal quality of the various statements deemed ‘testimonial.’”216  Interest-
ingly, the court added that 911 operators attempt to determine how to respond to a call,
rather than conduct “interrogation in contemplation of a future prosecution.”217 
After noting the analysis in Corella, another California court used a slightly
different approach in People v. Caudillo.218  Although citing the reasoning of Corella,
the Caudillo court applied the case’s facts to the specific “core class” of ‘testimonial’
statements in Crawford.219  The Caudillo court held that a 911 call was not “ex parte
in-court testimony or its functional equivalent,”220 an “extrajudicial statement . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials,”221 or “‘made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at later trial.’”222  Therefore, admission of the 911 call did not violate
the Confrontation Clause.223
Several state court decisions have used a less stringent interpretation of Crawford
than the Moscat line of cases.  In the recent case of Talley III v. Kentucky, 224 the
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Supreme Court of Kentucky allowed the admission of a 911 call as a present sense
impression.  In Talley III, an anonymous caller to 911 stated that a shooting had
occurred and gave a description of the shooter and his direction of flight.225  In
upholding the admission of the statement, the Talley III court found that a 911 call
simply “does not implicate the principle evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed.”226  The Talley III court then held that the statement did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because it fell in a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” and was
sufficiently reliable,227 a line of reasoning that is clearly dismissive of Crawford.  In
considering another situation involving 911 calls, the Supreme Court of Kentucky gave
more deference to Crawford,228 although it noted that Crawford’s definition of
‘testimonial’ was very limited.229
Using a cursory analysis of Crawford in Pitts v. State,230 the Georgia Court of
Appeals also found 911 calls to be ‘non-testimonial.’  In Pitts, a woman made a series
of calls to 911 after her estranged husband had broken into her house.231  In upholding
the trial court’s admission of the 911 calls, the Pitts court noted that statements made
while an incident occurred were not ‘testimonial’ under Crawford.232  Because the
statements were “made without premeditation or afterthought,” they could not be
‘testimonial.’233  As such, the trial court properly admitted the statements as excited
utterances.234
As demonstrated, state courts’ reasoning differs when determining the ‘testi-
monial’ nature of a 911 call.  The concurring opinion in State v. Nelson,235 an Ohio
Court of Appeals opinion, is another example.  In Nelson, a woman called 911 after
she had been struck by the defendant, Nelson, though he was no longer present at the
home.236  Although the majority did not rule on the 911 call’s ‘testimonial’ nature, the
concurring opinion found the 911 call not to be ‘testimonial.’237  The concurrence
reasoned that because (1) the woman was not a suspect, and (2) her excited utterances
“were not made during police interrogation or . . . structured official questioning,” the
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and the people involved, the purpose of the information is for investigation, prosecution, and potential use
at a judicial proceeding; it makes no difference what the caller believes.”).
call could not be ‘testimonial.’238  Therefore, Crawford’s concern with ex parte
examinations was not implicated.239
B.  Cases Finding a 911 Call ‘Testimonial’
New York state courts have been split as to the ‘testimonial’ nature of 911 calls
after Crawford.  Moscat makes a blanket statement about all 911 calls, and is followed
by some New York courts.  Other New York courts, however, have produced decisions
to the contrary.
For example, in People v. Cortes,240 the Supreme Court for Bronx County, New
York, held that 911 calls reporting a crime are ‘testimonial.’241  In Cortes, the State
charged the defendant with attempted murder, second degree assault, and weapon
possession in connection with a shooting.242  In its case in chief, the prosecution
attempted to admit recordings of two 911 calls made by witnesses who refused to
testify in court.243  The court declined to admit the calls and held them inadmissible
under Crawford.  In reaching this conclusion, the court found that, due to the methods
used by police in taking a 911 call, calls reporting a crime fell under the definition of
“interrogation.”244  In addition, the state intended to use 911 to gather information
about crimes.245  Moreover, the procedures used by 911 operators made these calls
‘formal’ statements as described in Crawford.246  
The court took a different approach to the meaning of ‘testimonial.’  The court
decided that a proper definition should be objective, based on the primary purpose of
the statement.247  Under this test, business records, medical information, and res gestae
would not require cross-examination.248  911 calls reporting a crime, however, would
be ‘testimonial’.249  The court also noted that the ‘testimonial’ nature of the call is not
dependent on the subjective intent of the caller.250  Rather, the 911 call’s role as an
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The 911 statement is made orally, but it is recorded as would a statement made to a
police officer, a prosecutor or a prosecutor's stenographer who then writes it down. The
statements on the 911 tapes are preserved as official documents. In New York a summary
copy (a sprint report) is made and preserved separately from the tape. The preserved
conversations on tape are available by subpoena. The tapes must be delivered as Rosario
material if the witness is available and testifies.  If a tape is lost or improperly or prematurely
destroyed, an adverse inference may be available.  The tapes must be given to the defense
if they contain exculpatory information.  
The 911 call reporting a crime preserved on tape is the modern equivalent, made
possible by technology, to the depositions taken by magistrates or JPs under the Marian
committal statute.
Id.
252. Id. at 416.
253. 2004 WL 3048648 (N.Y. Supp.).
254. Id. at *1-*2.
255. Id. at *3 (“The 911 call . . . contains a solemn declaration for the purpose of establishing the fact
that the defendant is committing a robbery.  The caller is making a formal out of court statement to a
government officer for the purpose of establishing this fact.”).
256. Id. (“[T]he 911 call falls within the category of . . . ‘witnesses’ against the accused in other words,
those who ‘bear testimony.’”).
257. Id.
258. Id. at *4 (“[t]he functional equivalent of a formal statement to a police officer”).
259. Id. at *8.
260. Id. at *4 ([T]he Supreme Court is referring to interrogation in a very broad and inclusive manner.”).
261. Id.
262. See supra, note 160 and accompanying text.
263. 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
264. Id. at 84.
integral document used by the State in the judicial process made it ‘testimonial’251
because its purpose was to “invoke police action and the prosecutorial process.”252 
In another New York case, People v. Dobbin,253 the Supreme Court of New York
County found a 911 call to be ‘testimonial’ under reasoning similar to Cortes.  In
Dobbin, a bystander to a robbery called 911 and described the perpetrator, who was
later convicted.254  Because the caller made the 911 call with the purpose of
incriminating the defendant,255 the court held it was the type of statement implicated
by Crawford.256  In addition, the court noted, the caller objectively believed that his
call would be available for use at a later trial, making it ‘testimonial.’257  Similar to the
reasoning of the Cortes court, the Dobbin court held that the formal nature of the call
to the police operator made the 911 call equivalent to a police interrogation.258
Interestingly, however, the court refused to reverse the conviction because admission
of the 911 call constituted harmless error.259
The Dobbin court, therefore, took a broad view of how Crawford defined the
meaning of “interrogation.”260  The court also rejected an argument that the present
sense impression hearsay exception could render the statement ‘non-testimonial,’261 a
view contrary to other courts that suggest such statements (e.g., excited utterances) are
never ‘testimonial.’262  
An appellate court in Illinois was willing to differentiate between statements
within the same 911 call in People v. West.263  In West, the defendant, Marcus West,
kidnapped and sexually assaulted a cab driver, later abandoning her.264  The victim was
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274. Id.  The Court further noted that “statements volunteered for the purpose of ‘invoking police action
and the prosecutorial process,’ or responses to questions posed for the purpose of collecting information
‘useful to the criminal justice system,’ are testimonial in nature.”  Id. (citing People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d
401, 416 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)).
275. Id. at *9.
276. Id.  The court noted that these statements were made in response to questions asked with the pur-
pose of assisting a police investigation.  Id. 
277. Id. at 92.  The court found many other evidentiary statements ‘testimonial’ besides portions of the
911 call, including statements made to police at the hospital, id. at 87-88, and statements of identification
made to a doctor and nurse, id. at 89-90.
278. 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
279. Id. at 1263.
280. Id.
281. Id.
able to get to a house and request help from the homeowner.265  Among the evidence
admitted was the recording of a 911 call where the dispatcher asked the victim a series
of questions, using the homeowner as an intermediary.266  These questions included a
description of the crime, the victim’s location, age, and medical condition.267  The
dispatcher also asked about the victim’s vehicle, the direction the assailants left in, and
property they had stolen.268  West was found and later convicted for aggravated vehi-
cular hijacking, kidnapping, armed robbery, and five counts of aggravated sexual
assault.269  The victim did not testify at trial.270  On appeal, the defendant argued that
the admission of several out-of-court statements into evidence violated his right to
confrontation because they were ‘testimonial.’271  In reviewing the 911 call, the court
rejected any bright line rule.272  Rather, the court held that a 911 statement is
‘testimonial’ if it is (1) “volunteered for the purpose of initiating police action or
criminal prosecution; or (2) provided in response to an interrogation, the purpose of
which was to gather evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.”273  The court justified
this reasoning finding that both situations implicated the Confrontation Clause.274
Applying this test, the court found that the victim’s statements about her medical
condition, age, and location were not ‘testimonial.’275  Other portions, however, of her
911 call were ‘testimonial,’ including the description of her vehicle, stolen personal
property, and the direction the assailants fled in.276  Finding that the admission of this
evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.277
The Washington Court of Appeals found a 911 call to be ‘testimonial’ in nature,
despite the admission of the statement in trial as an excited utterance in State v.
Powers.278  In Powers, the defendant violated a no-contact order prohibiting him from
contact with T.P.279  After Powers had left T.P.’s home, she called 911 to report his
violation.280  Powers was later arrested and sentenced to a 14-month sentence.281  The
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288. 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
289. Id. at 298.
290. Id.  See also Appellant’s Brief at 8, 10, State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(No. A03-1197).
291. Id. at 299.  See also Appellant’s Brief at 8, 10, State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004) (No. A03-1197).
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294. Appellant’s Brief at 10, State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (No. A03-1197).
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297. Respondent’s Brief at 9, State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (No. A03-1197).
298. State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d at 298.
911 call was later admitted into evidence as an excited utterance.282  In appealing his
conviction, Powers argued that admission of the 911 call violated his right of
confrontation because T.P. did not testify at trial.283  The appellate court examined the
call and rejected admission based solely on its nature as an excited utterance.284  The
court also held that trial courts should assess 911 calls under Crawford on a case-by-
case basis to decide if they are ‘testimonial’ or based on interrogation.285  Finding that
the 911 call was not part of the event, or a request for help, the court held the 911 call
to be ‘testimonial.’286  Rather, the call was intended to report Powers’ criminal
violation and assist in his prosecution.287
VIII.  THE MINNESOTA COURT OF APPEALS AND STATE V. WRIGHT
The Minnesota Court of Appeals was given the opportunity to consider the impact
of the Crawford decision on 911 calls in State v. Wright.288  In Wright, the defendant
David Wright and his girlfriend, R.R., lived together in an apartment in Minneapolis.289
In the early morning of November 24th, 2004, the two had an argument in their
apartment in the presence of S.R., R.R.’s fifteen-year-old sister.290  The argument
concerned Wright’s desire to leave the apartment and R.R.’s refusal to give him
keys.291  During the argument, R.R. attempted to call 911, but Wright smashed the
phone.292  R.R. then claimed that Wright grabbed a handgun from the front closet and
pointed it at her and S.R.293  R.R. then gave Wright the apartment keys and he left.294
After Wright was gone, R.R. called 911 from a different telephone.295  During this call,
a shaken and traumatized R.R. described Wright to the 911 operator and said that
Wright had waived a gun at her and her sister.296  R.R. gave Wright’s name and an
accurate description to the 911 operator, mentioned that he had keys to her apartment,
and detailed her extreme fear of his possible return.297  During this call, a police officer
who was responding to the initial 911 call attempt saw Wright on the street and
recognized him from a description broadcast by the 911 operator.298  The officer
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The four arguments were: 1) that Wright’s statement to the officer that he didn’t have a gun anymore was
inadmissible as an involuntary, coerced statement, id. at 12; 2) the police interview at R.R.’s apartment was
not an excited utterance, id. at 15; 3) the trial court improperly allowed Wright’s impeachment with four
prior convictions, id. at 23; and 4) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by
analogizing the victimless prosecution to a murder case, id. at 25.
315. Id. at title page.
316. 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004).
attempted to stop Wright, but he fled.299  According to the officer, he could see Wright
holding a handgun.300  After a pursuit, the officer released a police dog from his car and
the dog caught Wright by the leg.301  At this point, Wright was knocked to the ground
and said, “I don’t have the gun anymore.”302  After a search of the chase scene, officers
found a handgun under a car, though without any usable fingerprints.303  The 911 call
lasted through this period of time, and R.R. was informed that Wright had been
arrested.304  R.R. was then informed that an officer would visit her for questioning,
which occurred forty-five minutes later.305  Later at R.R.’s apartment, an officer spoke
with the two victims and got a detailed story of the occurrence.306  The officer also
uncovered a bag in the front closet containing a gun clip and bullets.307
Wright was charged with felony possession of a firearm and two counts of second-
degree assault.308  During trial, R.R. and S.R. refused to testify, despite repeated
attempts by the State.309  According to R.R., both R.R. and S.R. were concerned for
their safety because Wright still had keys to their apartment and had called them from
jail threatening to have someone harm them if they testified.310  The court then allowed
a recording of R.R.’s 911 call and testimony of her conversation with the officer at her
apartment to be used at trial.311  These hearsay statements were admitted under the
excited utterance exception in Minnesota’s rules of evidence.312  Wright was found
guilty of all three counts and sentenced to three concurrent sentences of sixty
months.313
A.  Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, Wright advanced four arguments concerning the evidence used at
trial.314  Wright filed his initial appellant brief on January 22, 2004;315  Crawford v.
Washington was decided March 8, 2004.316  In Wright’s Reply Brief, filed March 16,
he contested admission of the 911 call and police interviews on Confrontation Clause
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and the 911 call was not harmless error.  Id.
327. Respondent’s Supplemental Reply Brief and Appendix at 3, State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (No.
A03-1197).
328. Id. at 3.
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330. Id. at 6-7 (citing Illinois v. White, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)).
331. Id. at 7-8 (quoting Illinois v. White 502 U.S. at 364). 
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grounds.317  Wright argued that statements made to police officers were ‘testimonial’
and could not be admitted under a hearsay exception.318  In addition, he contended that
the 911 call was ‘testimonial’ because of its intended use in a later trial.319
As a result of Crawford, both Wright and the State filed supplemental reply briefs
to advance Sixth Amendment arguments.  Wright argued that, under Crawford, an
excited utterance hearsay exception could not allow admission of ‘testimonial’
statements if the declarant failed to testify at trial.320  Although the excited utterance
exception may have existed at the enactment of the Sixth Amendment, there was no
legal basis for admission of these ‘testimonial’ statements.321  Historically, the excited
utterance was termed a “spontaneous declaration” considered res gestae – an impulsive
response to a startling event without time to reflect, rather than a recollection of the
event.322  The later broadening of the exception to recollections “failed to be properly
tested against the constraints of the Sixth Amendment until Crawford.”323  Applying
this argument to R.R.’s 911 call, Wright argued that R.R.’s statements were not part
of the res gestae and were calculated to result in Wright’s arrest.324  In addition, her
statements were part of an orderly procedure used by the 911 operator for criminal
investigations and prosecutions.325  Therefore, the State’s failure to subpoena R.R. and
compel her to testify constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment.326
The State argued that the excited utterances to the 911 operator were not barred
under Crawford 327 because they were not ‘testimonial.’328  First, the State argued that
Crawford did not intend to bar admission of excited utterances because they were a
historical exception to the confrontation right.329  Noting that Crawford did not define
the meaning of ‘testimonial,’ the State looked to the concurring opinion of Justices
Scalia and Thomas in Illinois v. White.330  Justice Thomas noted the difficulties in
determining if statements are made “in contemplation of legal proceedings” and
questioned whether the perspective of the declarant or officer should control.331  The
State argued that Crawford strongly suggested that the intent of the declarant should
control whether a statement was ‘testimonial.’332  In support of this position, the State
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343. Id.  This is interesting, because it suggests that an anonymous person could intentionally
incriminate a defendant with hearsay admissible at trial without fear of cross-examination.  This is surely
a danger that the Confrontation Clause was intended to address.
noted that the Crawford Court had approved of several cases that would be consistent
with Crawford only if the declarant’s intentions were determinative.333  Applying this
principle to R.R.’s 911 call, the State argued that her excited utterance could not
possibly have been made for use at a future criminal trial.334  The statement was
therefore ‘non-testimonial’ and subject only to hearsay law.335
B.  The Decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals
The Minnesota Court of Appeals then had the opportunity to determine if it would
hold the 911 call ‘testimonial’, thereby reversing Wright’s conviction.336  The court
began with an analysis of Crawford v. Washington and its analysis of the admissibility
of ‘testimonial’ hearsay statements.337  The court distinguished the custodial, Miranda-
warned interrogation in Crawford, and addressed the ‘testimonial’ nature of a 911
call.338  The court focused on the three formulations of ‘testimonial’ evidence given in
Crawford: 1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent”; 2) “extra-
judicial statements” similar to “formalized ‘testimonial’ materials”; and 3) statements
which would “lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at later trial.”339  The court also noted the specific examples of
‘testimonial’ statements provided by the Court.340  The court determined that the 911
call did not fit under any of “the definitions or the examples of ‘testimonial’ state-
ments.”341
The court noted that 911 calls are made because the caller wants protection, not
because the caller “expects the report to be used later at trial with the caller bearing
witness.”342  The “cloak of anonymity” surrounding 911 calls was viewed as making
these calls ‘non-testimonial.’343  The court, appearing to adopt the State’s view that the
declarant’s intent controls, made a blanket statement that excited utterances in a 911
call could not be ‘testimonial’:
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Even under the broadest definition of “testimonial” cited in Crawford, which focuses
on whether an objective witness would reasonably believe the statement would later
be available for use at trial, the 911 call does not qualify as “testimonial” evidence.
Statements in a 911 call by a victim struggling for self-control and survival only
moments after an assault simply do not qualify as knowing responses to structured
questioning in an investigative environment in which the declarant reasonably expects
that the responses will be used in later judicial proceedings.344
The court distinguished the case of People v. Cortes,345 which had found that 911 calls
are “the functional equivalent of a police interrogation.”346  The court noted that the
evidence did not show a formalized protocol for the 911 call, or that there was an
intention to use the 911 dialogue in an eventual prosecution.347  Interestingly, Wright
had argued that the 911 system, by design, was intended to supplement prosecutorial
evidence at trial.348  
The court later declined to examine the Confrontation Clause implications of the
police interview at R.R.’s apartment, finding that any error at trial was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because the 911 call was sufficient evidence for convic-
tion.349  Also finding that Wright’s other arguments for appeal did not hold merit, the
court affirmed his conviction.350
In a concurring opinion, Judge Hudson agreed with the court that the 911 call was
not ‘testimonial’ within the meaning of Crawford.351  Judge Hudson wrote separately
to point out that not all 911 calls are ‘non-testimonial’ despite being classified as
excited utterances.352  Whether a call is an excited utterance is irrelevant if the state-
ment is also ‘testimonial.’353  Judge Hudson then suggested cases where a 911 caller
might have dual motives—such as when a genuinely frightened female caller is also
aware her statements may be used for investigation and prosecution.354  In such a case,
the call would be an excited utterance but also ‘testimonial.’355  Citing People v.
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Cortes, Judge Hudson noted that some 911 calls “are made specifically to invoke the
investigation and prosecutorial function of the police.”356  Arguing that “trial courts
must evaluate 911 calls on a case-by-case basis,”357 Judge Hudson found that R.R. had
wanted protection during her call, without suggesting that “she reasonably believed her
statements would be available for use at a later trial.”358
IX.  CRITIQUE OF THE WRIGHT DECISION
The Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Wright appears to place the court in
the Moscat line of cases, which find that an excited utterance in a 911 call is not
‘testimonial.’  As in Moscat, the court focuses on the perspective of the 911 caller and
the caller’s intentions.  In addition, the court suggests that all excited utterances in a
911 call are, by definition, not ‘testimonial.’359  The court also dismisses any argument
that the 911 call was a formalized interrogation.360  This places the Wright decision in
similar company with other court decisions that have suggested that an excited
utterance can never be ‘testimonial.’361  Although the Wright decision’s outcome was
arguably the correct one, the court’s reasoning was incomplete.  First, the court’s
statements regarding the ‘testimonial’ nature of excited utterances leave open the
possibility of abuse by declarants with both ‘testimonial’ and ‘non-testimonial’
intentions.  Second, the court focuses on the perspective and intentions of the victim,
when the listener’s (here, the State’s) perspectives and intentions are also clearly
relevant to Confrontation Clause analysis.  Third, the court could have redacted
‘testimonial’ portions of the 911 call and still provided adequate evidence for the
prosecution.  Fourth, the court could have allowed the 911 call into evidence in its
entirety without a Confrontation Clause analysis by ruling that Wright had forfeited his
right of confrontation by threatening R.R.
A.  The Dual Intentions of an Excited Utterance
The Wright court suggested in its decision that excited utterances in the 911 call
could not be ‘testimonial’ “[e]ven under the broadest definition . . . cited in
Crawford.”362  It is quite possible, however, for a 911 caller, even in a domestic vio-
lence situation, to have dual motivations for the call.  Judge Hudson’s concurring
opinion in Wright argued this distinction, where the caller may be “genuinely
frightened” but also “believe and/or understand that her statements will be used at later
trial.”363  Other commentators have similarly argued that an excited utterance can have
‘testimonial’ intention, despite the circumstances surrounding the statement.  In
particular, in cases of domestic violence, the victim may have a history of interaction
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with law enforcement.364  Efforts by government and social service agencies to boost
public awareness of domestic violence have helped notify victims that their reports to
law enforcement will result in criminal prosecution.365  In fact, one commentator has
suggested that a 911 call in a domestic violence scenario is “tantamount to a request
for arrest,”366 and that “911 callers realize they are creating evidence for the prosecu-
tion”367 without having to “appear at trial, take an oath, or subject themselves to cross-
examination.”368
In cases such as Wright, it may be best to examine the intentions and beliefs of the
victim on a case-by-case basis, as in State v. Powers,369 rather than using a bright line
rule.  Surely, excited utterances in situations where the statement is part of the res
gestae, as in Pitts v. State,370 may be made without any ‘testimonial’ intent.  However,
in other cases where the statement comes after the event, it may be ‘testimonial.’  In
Wright, certain facts suggested that the call could have had a ‘testimonial’ quality—the
call was made after Wright had left the apartment, and R.R. surely knew that her
boyfriend was a former felon.  R.R.’s fear of his pending return, however, and the
characterization of her 911 call by the trial court were probably enough to allow their
admission.
B.  Consideration of the State’s Perspective
The Wright court did not consider the intentions of the 911 operator in eliciting
the information gained from the call, except for a short statement that the call’s
dialogue was “aimed at resolving an emergent situation by apprehending a threatening
aggressor and providing R.R. and S.R. with information to ensure their safety.”371
Similarly, although the court passed on deciding if statements made during the later
police interview at R.R.’s apartment were ‘testimonial,’ the court strongly suggested
that they were not because of the victim’s emotional distress.372  The court believed
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that it was unlikely the victim’s statements were calculated to be used in legal
proceedings.373
The intentions and motivations of the government should be considered when
determining the ‘testimonial’ nature of a victim’s statements.  After all, it is the State
that prosecutes an alleged criminal.  It is the State that requires and must gather
evidence for its case.  When interviewing a declarant, a government agent may be
skilled in deliberately framing a question to get a desired response suitable for
prosecutorial use.374  The government, therefore, has a role in eliciting statements
damaging to the defendant.375  A defendant is harmed by a declarant’s statement no
matter if the statement’s root cause is a malevolent declarant or a manipulative
government official.376  Under the circumstances of a 911 call, the initial purpose of
both the caller and operator may be to provide assistance and safety.  At some point
during the conversation, however, the purpose of the call may evolve into one of
eliciting ‘testimonial’ statements.377  The Confrontation Clause should extend to the
role of the government in eliciting and manipulating statements for prosecution,
regardless of the declarant’s innocent intentions.378
Other courts have supported an approach to Crawford that includes the
government’s intentions along with those of the declarant’s.  The court in People v.
West 379 focused on the purposes and intentions of the police officers conducting the
questioning in determining that the declarant’s statements were ‘testimonial.’380  The
court pointed out that the officers’ questions were specific and purposeful, and bore
statements that “would implicate the central concerns of the Confrontation Clause.”381
Similarly, the court in Snowden v. State382 held that statements by a child in an inter-
view were ‘testimonial’ because they were being elicited by a social worker for the
express purpose of developing testimony for use in a trial.383  The court in People v.
Cortes384 analyzed the nature of a 911 call and analogized it to an interrogation.385  The
procedure and rules used by the police in these calls showed that information was
being elicited in a particular pattern by the government agent.386  The caller’s subjec-
tive belief was not dispositive.387  These cases show that the caller is not the only
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person whose intentions are important in Confrontation Clause analysis.  Although the
evidence in Wright did not suggest the motives of the 911 operator, the consideration
is important.
C.  Redaction as a Compromise
A possible solution for courts, such as the one in Wright, is to redact 911 calls to
separate those portions that are deemed ‘testimonial’ in nature.  Redaction is the
careful editing of documents or evidence to remove inadmissible or inappropriate
portions.388  This solution was used in Illinois v. West to allow portions of a 911 call
that identified the victim’s medical condition, age, and location.389  Other statements,
however, not related to the victim’s immediate condition (direction of the assailant’s
escape and vehicle type, stolen personal property) were not allowed.390  There is no
overwhelming reason that a 911 call cannot be broken into smaller portions according
to their ‘testimonial’ intent.391  Most often, however, the entire 911 call is admitted into
evidence.392
D.  A Solution Without Sacrificing the Confrontation Clause: Forfeiture
In Crawford, Justice Scalia reminded us that the Supreme Court accepts the rule
of forfeiture, where the confrontation right can be extinguished by actions of the
defendant.393  Since Crawford, some courts have used the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
rule to allow statements by a declarant that is unavailable due to the defendant’s
conduct.394  Examples of such forfeiture may include obstruction of the trial, or
murdering or intimidating the declarant.395  In the realm of domestic violence prosecu-
tion, one study found that almost half of victims reported that their abusers “had
threatened physical violence if they continued to cooperate with prosecution efforts.”396
Threats other than physical violence can include both economic damage and harm to,
or loss of custody of, the victim’s children.397  Prosecutors are now savvy to such
threats and may collect evidence to prove forfeiture by the defendant.398  Prosecutors
realize that domestic violence abusers, however, do not necessarily require additional
threats after the beginning of prosecution to procure a victim’s unavailability.399  The
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systematic, ongoing nature of domestic violence may make additional threats
unnecessary.400  Such systematic activity may arguably create forfeiture over the period
of abuse prior to prosecution, rather than requiring any specific act by the abuser.401
In Wright, there was clear evidence of intimidation by the defendant that would
have allowed the court to admit the evidence despite any ‘testimonial’ intentions of
either R.R. or the 911 operator.  Wright had called R.R. and threatened both her and
S.R. if they testified at trial.  Specifically, he told R.R. that if they testified, “someone
[would] come over to her house and do something to her.”402  This was a clear case of
forfeiture and would have allowed admission of any of her statements.403  The Wright
court, however, did not consider this possibility, and the prosecutor did not argue it.
X.  CONCLUSION
State v. Wright is an example of the reasoning used by many courts, in the wake
of Crawford, to admit 911 calls when the declarant is unavailable.  The Minnesota
Court of Appeals has demonstrated an intention to allow such statements, a decision
that is commendable considering the importance of such statements to prosecute crimes
of violence.  The reasoning of this decision, however, should have considered that such
statements may be a source of abuse by prosecutors and declarants.  Such a danger is
one that the Confrontation Clause was intended to address.  Other doctrines, such as
redaction and forfeiture, may provide for protection of the public without compro-
mising the right of confrontation.  The court should have recognized such dangers in
its decision and refrained from overarching language that it may need to step back from
in the future.404 
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